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Payne v. Tennessee: The Supreme Court
Places Its Stamp of Approval on the
Use of "Victim Impact Evidence" During
Capital Sentencing Proceedings

'

Over the past few years, "victims' rights" advocates have
insisted that state legislatures and Congress make the criminal
justice system more responsive and accountable to the victims
of crime.' These advocates have been particularly outspoken
about the lack of attention paid to crime victims during the
sentencing phase of capital trial^.^ The majority of state legislatures3 and Congress4 responded to these demands by passing laws that allow the sentencing authority to consider "victim
impact eviden~e"~
when meting out a criminal's punishment.
In Payne v. Tennessee6 the Supreme Court also placed its
stamp of approval on the use of victim impact evidence during
the sentencing phase of capital trials. The Payne Court held
that the Eighth Amendment does not erect a per se bar prohibiting a capital sentencing jury from considering victim impact
evidence relating to the personal characteristics of the victim
and the emotional impact of the crimes on the victim's family.'
This Note examines the Supreme Court's decision in
Payne. Part I1 provides the background for the case by briefly
1. See Diane Kiesel, Crime and Punishment: Victim Rights Movement Presses
Courts, Legislatures, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1984, at 25, 25; Frank Carrington & George
Nicholson, The Victims' Movement: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 11 PEPP. L.
REV. 1 (1984).
2. See Josephine Gittler, Expanding the Role of the Victim in a Criminal Action: An Overview of Issues and Problems, 11 PEpp. L. REV. 117, 172-76 (1984).
3.
See Phillip A. Talbert, Comment, The Relevance of Victim Impact Statements to the Criminal Sentencing Decision, 36 UCLA L. REV. 199, 200 (1988).
4.
See Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291,
§ 2(b)(l), 96 Stat. 1248, 1248-49.
5. In this Note, the term "victim impact evidencen includes any evidence relating to the personal characteristics of the victim or the emotional effects of the
crime on the victim's family. See Charlton T. Howard 111, Note, Booth v. Maryland-Death Knell for the Victim Impact Statement?, 47 MD.L. REV. 701, 701 n.2
(1988).
111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
6.
7.
Id. at 2609.
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summarizing the two Supreme Court decisions that Payne
overr~led.~
Part I11 outlines the facts of the case and sets forth
the Court's reasons for allowing a capital sentencing jury to
consider victim impact evidence. Part IV analyzes Payne by
focusing on the decision's underlying rationale and the new
standard the decision establishes. This Note concludes that
Payne achieves a just result by striking a balance between the
rights of murder victims and the rights of capital murder defendants.

The Supreme Court first ruled on the use of victim impact
evidence during the sentencing phase of capital trials in the
1987 case of Booth u. M~ryland.~
In Booth the Court reviewed
a Maryland statute1' requiring that a "victim impact statement"" be presented at the sentencing phase of a capital
murder trial. The High Court declared the statute invalid, to
the extent that it required consideration of victim impact evidence,12 because a capital sentencing jury's consideration of
such evidence violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.13 The Court reasoned
that victim impact evidence was "irrelevant to a capital sentencing decision, and that its admission creates a constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury may impose the death
penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner."14
The Supreme Court reiterated this holding two years later
in South Carolina v. Gathers.15 In Gathers the trial court admitted into evidence a religious tract and a voter registration
8.
Payne expressly overruled Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), and
South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989). Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2611.
9.
482 U.S. 496 (1987).
10.
MD. ANN. CODEart. 41 $ 4-609(d) (1986). The statute stated that "[iln any
case in which the death penalty . . . is requested . . . a presentence investigation,
including a victim impact statement, shall be completed . . . and shall be considered by the court or jury before whom the separate sentencing proceeding is conducted . . . .* Id.
11. The victim impact statement in Booth "emphasized the victims' outstanding
personal qualities . . . . [It also] described the emotional and personal problems
the family members [had] faced as a result of the crimes." Booth, 482 U.S. at 499.
Id. a t 509.
12.
13.
Id. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CONST.amend. VIII.
14.
Booth, 482 U.S. at 502-03.
15.
490 U.S. 805 (1989).
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card that were found on the victim. In his closing argument,
the prosecutor suggested that these items were indicative of
the victim's outstanding personal characteristics and his value
to the community. On appeal, the Court extended Booth by
declaring that victim impact evidence offered by a prosecutor
during the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial violated
the Eighth Amendment.'6 The Gathers Court reasoned that
"[a]llo~ingthe jury to rely on [this information] . . . could result in imposing the death sentence because of factors about
which the defendant was unaware, and that were irrelevant to
the decision to kill."" The decision also noted "that '[flor purposes of imposing the death penalty . . . [the defendant's] punishment must be tailored to his personal responsibility and
moral guilt.' "I8
In both Booth and Gathers, the Court clearly held that the
admissibility of victim impact evidence was not to be determined on a case-by-case basis, but that it was per se inadmissible in the sentencing phase of a capital trial unless it "relate[d] directly to the circumstances of the crime.'"' Payne expressly overruled Booth and GathersZ0by attacking the reasoning on which the two cases relied.21
111. Payne v. Tennessee

A. The Facts
Pervis Tyrone Payne's girlfriend lived in a n apartment
complex in Millington, Tennessee. On Saturday, June 27, 1987,
Payne visited the apartment complex several times in search of
his girlfriend, but she was not a t home. Payne returned to the
apartment complex around 3:00 p.m., after having passed the
morning and early afternoon drinking beer and injecting cocaine. He then entered a n apartment across the hall from his
girlfriend's and began making sexual advances towards Charisse Christopher. Payne became violent when Charisse resisted his advances. A neighbor called the police after hearing

16. Id. at 811.
17. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. at 505).
18. Id. at 810 (alteration in original) (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
801 (1982)).
19. Booth, 482 U.S. at 507 n.10; Gathers, 490 U.S. at 811.
20. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2610-11.
21.
See d. at 2605.
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Charisse yell, "Get out, get out," followed by a "blood-curdling
Upon their arrival, the police encountered a horrifying
scene. Blood was smeared on the walls and floor of the apartment. Charisse, her two-year old daughter Lacie, and her
three-year old son Nicholas were lying on the kitchen floor.
Charisse and Lacie were both dead. The police found that Charisse had sustained forty-two direct knife wounds and forty-two
defensive wounds on her arms and hands. Lacie had suffered
stab wounds to the chest, abdomen, back, and head. Nicholas
survived despite several wounds inflicted by a butcher knife
that penetrated his body from front to back. The murder weapon, a butcher knife, was found at Lacie's feet. The police also
found Payne's baseball cap on Lacie's arm and discovered three
cans of malt liquor bearing Payne's fingerprints near her
body.23
Payne was apprehended later that day hiding in the attic
of a former girlfriend's home. He had blood on his body and
clothes and several scratches across his chest. The police also
found in a nearby dumpster a bloody white shirt stuffed in
Payne's overnight bag. The blood stains on Payne's body and
clothes matched the victims' blood types.24
At trial, the jury convicted Payne on two counts of first
degree murder and one count of assault with intent to commit
murder in the'first degree.25During the sentencing phase of
the trial, Payne presented the testimony of four witnesses: his
mother and father, his current girlfriend, and a clinical psychologist specializing in criminal court evaluation work. The
parents said that he was good with children and that he was a
good son.26Payne's girlfriend stated that he was a very caring
person and "behaved just like a father that loved his kids?
The clinical psychologist testified that Payne was the most
polite prisoner he had ever met.28
The State then presented the testimony of Charisse's mother. When asked how her grandson Nicholas had been affected
by the murders of his mother and sister, she responded:
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Respondent's Brief at 3-4, Payne (No. 90-5721).
Payne, 111 S. C t . at 2602.

Id.
Id. at 2601.
Id. at 2603.
Id at 2602.
Id.
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"He cries for his mom. He doesn't seem to understand why
she doesn't come home. And he cries for his sister Lacie. He
comes to me many times during the week and asks me,
Grandmama, do you miss my Lacie. And I tell him yes. He
says, I'm worried about my L a ~ i e . " ~

In his closing argument for the death penalty, the prosecutor
emphasized the emotional impact that the murders had, and
would continue to have, on Nicholas's life.30
Following the testimony and the prosecutor's closing statement, the jury sentenced Payne to death on each of the murder
counts. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Tennessee upheld
Payne's conviction and senten~e.~'
The United States Supreme
Court then granted certiorari and affirmed the decision.32In
so doing, the Court reversed its prior rulings, and held that the
Eighth Amendment does not erect a per se bar prohibiting a
capital sentencing jury from considering victim impact eviden~e.~~

B. The Payne Court's Reasoning
In Payne, the Court first criticized the reasoning set forth
in Booth and Gathers, pointing out that both decisions were
based on the premises that evidence relating to a victim, or the
harm to a victim's family, does not "reflect on the defendant's
'blameworthiness,' and that only evidence relating t o 'blameworthiness' is relevant to the capital sentencing decision.'"*
The Payne Court denounced these premises, reasoning that the
harm caused by a criminal defendant has always been an essential concern of criminal law since the degree of harm caused
is important in determining the elements of the offense and the
appropriate punish~nent.~~
The majority concluded, therefore,
that victim impact evidence is relevant t o the sentencing decision because it conveys the full extent of the harm caused,
which the Court felt reflected on the defendant's blameworthines~.~~
Id. at 2603 (citation omitted).
Id.
State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10 (Tern.1990).
Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2611.
Id. at 2609.
Id. at 2605.
Id. See infia note 64.
Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2605.
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The Court also attacked Booth and Gathers on fairness
grounds. First, the Court criticized Booth's requirement that
the sentencing authority "focus on the defendant as a 'uniquely
individual human bein[g]""' when determining the defendant's punishment. The Court stated that this requirement was
derived from a "misreading of p r e ~ e d e n t , "and
~ ~ that the defendant should not receive such specialized treatment "wholly
apart from the crime which he had c~mmitted."~~
The Court
reasoned that it was inherently unfair to place a constitutional
bar against victim impact evidence while at the same time
allowing the defendant to introduce mitigating evidence totally
unrelated to the circumstances of the crime.40 Second, the
Court pointed out that the victim of a crime is also a unique
indi~idual:~and that admitting victim impact evidence makes
the sentencing proceeding fair by providing the jury with all
the information it needs to make its decision.42
The Court rejected Payne's argument that "admission of

37.
Booth, 482 U.S. a t 504 (alteration in original) (quoting Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion)). The Booth Court reasoned that allowing a capital sentencing jury t:, consider
victim impact evidence would violate this requirement. Id.
38.
Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2607.
39.
Id.
40.
Id. at 2607-09. See also State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 19 (Tern. 1990), in
which the Tennessee Supreme Court criticized the Booth rule:
I t is an affront to the civilized members of the human race to say
that at sentencing in a capital case, a parade of witnesses may praise the
background, charactclr and good deeds of Defendant (as was done in this
case), without limitation a s to relevancy, but nothing may be said that
bears u@onthe character of, or the harm imposed, upon the victims.
"[Tlhe State has a legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence which the defendant is entitled to pat in, by reminding the sentencer that just as the murderer should be considered as a n individual, so
too the victim is a n individual whose death represents a unique loss to
society and in particular to his family."
Payne, 111 S. Ct. a t 2608 (alteration in original) (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. a t 517
(White, J., dissenting)). See also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934)
(Cardozo, J.) ("[Jlustice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The
concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are
to keep the balance true.").
42.
Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2608. In Payne the Court emphasized that
[bly turning the victim into a "faceless stranger a t the penalty phase of a
capital trial," Gathers, 490 US. a t 821 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), Booth
deprives the State of the hll moral force of its evidence and may prevent
the jury from having before i t all the information necessary to determine
the proper punishment for a fwst-degree murder.
Id.
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victim impact evidence permits a jury to find that defendants
whose victims were assets to their community are more deserving of punishment than those whose victims are perceived to be
less
'Victim impact evidence," said the Payne
Court, "is not offered to encourage comparative judgments of
this kind,'"4 but rather to show "each victim's 'uniqueness as
an individual human being,' whatever the jury might think the
loss t o the community resulting from his death might be."45
Payne also advanced a procedural argument laid down in
Booth. The Booth Court "reasoned that victim impact evidence
must be excluded because it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the defendant to rebut such evidence without shifting
the focus of the sentencing hearing away from the defendant,
thus creating a ' "mini-trial" on the victim's character.' '"' The
Payne Court gave a two-fold answer to this argument. First, it
explained that excluding victim impact evidence a t the sentencing phase would not resolve the defendant's problem, since the
jury may already be aware of the victim impact evidence because it is introduced as relevant evidence during the guilt
phase of the triaL4? Second, the Court noted that the defendant's tactical reasons for not wanting to rebut victim impact evidence did not distinguish him from other parties faced
with this dilemma48because the defendant's tactical dilemma
did not override the necessity of allowing a sentencing jury to
hear all relevant evidence before making a decision.49
The Court advanced another reason why capital sentencing
juries should be allowed t o consider victim impact evidence.
Prior to Booth and Gathers, "the sentencing authority [was]
always . . . free to consider a wide range of relevant material."50 The Payne Court concluded that victim impact evidence
'

Id. at 2607.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Booth, 482 U.S.at 507).
Id.
Id. Although the Court did not explain this "dilemma," the Court was probably referring to defense counsel's difficult choice between rebutting victim impact
evidence or foregoing such an opportunity. By choosing not to rebut victim impact
evidence, defense counsel runs the risk that the sentencing authority will place
great weight in such evidence. On the other hand, if defense counsel elects to
rebut victim impact evidence, the sentencing authority's sympathies for the victim
may be aroused while its attitude toward the defendant may become hostile.
49.
Id.
50.
Id. at 2606.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
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falls within this "range" because the harm caused by the crime
is an important factor to take into account when imposing a
~entence.~~
Finally, the Court emphasized that its decision to eliminate the per se bar against the use of victim impact evidence is
not unfair to defendants because the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments impose certain limits on a state's death penalty
The Eighth Amendment limits state punishment
schemes by disallowing the death penalty for certain crimes.53
Once a state complies with this limitation, however, it has wide
latitude to choose the factors that are relevant to a sentencing
decision.54The Court reasoned, therefore, that "victim impact
evidence serves entirely legitimate purposes"55and is merely
another method "of informing the sentencing authority about
the specific harm caused by the crime in question."56 The
Fourteenth Amendment also protects the defendant. If "evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders
the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief."57
In the second half- of the opinion, the Court rejected
Payne's plea that the doctrine of stare decisis should prevent
the Court from overruling Booth and gather^.^' This Note
does not discuss the issue of stare decisis raised in the second
half of Payne; rather, the Note analyzes the Court's new rule

51.
52.
53.

Id.
See id. at 2607-08.
Id. The Payne Court identified these limits:
"[Tlhere is a required threshold below which the death penalty cannot be
imposed. In this context, the State must establish rational criteria that
narrow the decisionmaker's judgment as to whether the circumstances of
a particular defendant's case meet the threshold. Moreover, a societal
consensus that the death penalty is disproportionate to a particular offense prevents a State from imposing the death penalty for that offense."
Id. at 2608 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305-06 (1987)).
54.
Id. In Payne the Court stated that " '[wlithin the constitutional limitations
defined by our cases, the States enjoy their traditional latitude to prescribe the
method by which those who commit murder should be punished.' " Id. (quoting
Blystone v. P e ~ s y l v a n i a ,494 U.S. 299, 309 (1990)); see also California v. Ramos,
463 U.S. 992, 1001 (1983) ("Beyond these [constitutional] limitations . . . the Court
has deferred to the State's choice of substantive factors relevant to the penalty
determination.").
55.
Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2608.
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
Id. a t 2609-11.
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which allows the sentencing authority in a capital murder trial
to consider victim impact evidence.

The Payne Court correctly overruled Booth and Gathers.
The underlying rationale of Booth and Gathers was fundamentally unsound and did not justify a per se bar against the admission of evidence regarding the personal characteristics of a
murder victim and the impact of the crime on the victim's family members.

A. Victim Impact Evidence Reflects Upon
the Defendant's Personal Responsibility
and Moral Guilt and Is Highly Relevant
to the Sentencing Decision
Both Booth and Gathers reasoned that any evidence offered
at the sentencing phase of a capital trial must have "some
bearing on the defendant's 'personal responsibility and moral
guilt.' "59 While this is true, the decisions erroneously concluded that victim impact evidence does not reflect on the personal
responsibility and moral guilt of the defendant.''
1. Personal responsibility

Victim impact evidence illustrates the full extent of the
harm caused and directly reflects on the defendant's personal
responsibility. Booth incorrectly focuses on the defendant's
mental state, which it claims is the sole indicator of blameworthiness:' without considering the harm that results from the
crime. However, the harm caused should also be considered by
~ ~ defendants with the same
the sentencing a ~ t h o r i t y .Two
mental state frequently receive different punishmentsB3be59. Booth, 482 US. at 502 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 US. 782, 801
(1982)); see also Gathers, 490 US. at 810-11.
60.
In Booth and Gathers the Court concluded that victim impact evidence is
irrelevant to a capital sentencing decision because it presents "factors about which
the defendant was unaware, and that were irrelevant to the decision to kill."
Booth, 482 US. at 505; Gathers, 490 US. at 811.
61.
See Booth, 482 US. at 502, 504.
62.
In Booth, 482 US. at 519 (Scalia, J., dissenting), Justice Scalia opined that
"the amount of harm one causes does bear upon the extent of his 'personal responsibility.' "
63.
Justice Scalia gave an example in his dissenting opinion in Booth: "We may
take away the license of a driver who goes 60 miles an hour on a residential
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cause the harm caused is a relevant factor in determining personal responsibility and an appropriate p u n i ~ h m e n t .Thus,
~~
as Payne demonstrates, victim impact evidence is admissible
because the full extent of the harm caused is a direct measure
of the defendant's personal respon~ibility.~~

2. Moral guilt6"
Contrary to Booth, which claimed that victim impact evidence is generally "unrelated to the blameworthiness of a particular defendant,"67 Payne correctly recognizes that victim
impact evidence is often directly related to a defendant's moral
c ~ l p a b i l i t y Booth
. ~ ~ conceded that if a defendant has subjective knowledge of a victim's particular circumstances prior to
the crime, such knowledge is indicative of the defendant's moral
However, subjective knowledge of a victim's particular circumstances is not the only relevant factor in assessing a
defendant's moral guilt.
The objective foreseeable consequences of a capital defendant's actions should also be considered in determining his or
her moral guilt.'' It is indisputable that "[mlurder has fore-

street; but we will put him in jail for manslaughter if, though his moral guilt is
no greater, he is unlucky enough to kill someone during the escapade." Id.
Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2605. See generally Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and
64.
Punishment: A Critique of the Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal
Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1498 (1974) ("The criminal law attributes major
significance to the harm actually caused by a defendant's conduct, as distinguished
from the harm intended or risked.").
65.
See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2605.
66.
The terms "moral guilt" or "moral culpability" refer to the mental state of
the defendant (i.e., mens rea) at the time the crime was committed. Cf. Howard,
supm note 5, at 711; Richard S. Murphy, The Significance of Victim Harm: Booth
v. Maryland and the Philosophy of Punishment in the Supreme Court, 55 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1303, 1317 (1988).
67.
Booth, 482 U.S. at 504.
68.
See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2605.
69.
See Booth, 482 U.S. at 504-05. Booth, however, claimed that the "foreseeable consequences of a defendant's actions . . . [are not] relevant in the unique
circumstances of a capital sentencing hearing." Id. at 504.
70.
The Booth Court itself implicitly recognized that the objective foreseeable
consequences of a defendant's actions relate to his or her moral guilt. The Court
noted that a "defendant's degree of knowledge of the probable consequences of his
actions may increase his moral culpability in a constitutionally significant manner."
Id. at 505 (emphasis added). The phrase "defendant's degree of knowledge" refers
to the defendant's subjective knowledge, while the language "probable consequences"
seems to refer to the objective foreseeable consequences of a defendant's actions.
Thus, both an objective and a subjective inquiry must be made to determine
whether a particular defendant is morally guilty.

VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE
seeable consequence^."^' It is a fact of life that human beings
develop personal relationships with family and friends.72
When someone is killed, people are left behind to suffer.
Defendants may claim that the unintended consequences of
their actions-the suffering and grief borne by the victim's
family members-are completely unforeseeable and irrelevant
in determining moral guilt. Such an argument cannot stand up
to scrutiny. When someone voluntarily chooses to engage in a
criminal act, he or she runs a risk that unintended consequences will follow. Because defendants knowingly run this risk,
they are morally culpable for any harm which should be "reaWhat should be reasonably anticipated
sonably anti~ipated.'"~
Since all defendepends on human and societal e~perience.?~
dants are human beings living in society, each defendant
should reasonably anticipate the full range of consequences
that may flow from his or her actions (e.g., that the victim may
have family and friends who will grieve and suffer). Moreover,
because each defendant should anticipate the consequences of
his or her actions, the defendant's choice to run a risk is highly
relevant in assessing the defendant's mental state.75Thus, the
objective foreseeability of murder's consequences converts victim impact evidence into relevant information which bears
upon the defendant's moral guilt.

71.
Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2615 (Souter, J., concurring).
Justice Souter commented on the personal relationships that human beings
72.
develop:
Every defendant knows, if endowed with the mental competence for criminal responsibility, that the life he will take by his homicidal behavior is
that of a unique person, like himself, and that the person to be killed
probably has close associates, "survivors," who will suffer harms and deprivations from the victim's death. Just as defendants know that they are
not faceless human ciphers, they know that their victims are not valueless fungibles, and just as defendants appreciate the web of relationships
and dependencies in which they live, they know that their victims are not
human islands, but individuals with parents or children, spouses or
friends or dependents.

Id.
73.
Respondent's Brief a t 8, Payne (No. 90-5721).
Id.
74.
75.
If the defendant is aware of particular circumstances related to the crime
or the victim's life, even the Booth Court recognized that victim impact evidence
would reflect upon the defendant's moral guilt. See Booth, 482 U.S. a t 505.
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B. Admitting Victim Impact Evidence
During the Sentencing Phase Recognizes
the Rights of the Victim as an Individual
and Effects a Broad and Balanced Inquiry into
Both the Defendant's and the Victim's Rights
Payne strikes a fair balance between the rights of the criminal defendant and the murder victim. Booth advanced the
requirement that a capital defendant be treated as a " 'uniquely
individual human bein[g~.""~As part of this treatment, the
defendant was allowed to introduce a t the sentencing phase of
a trial virtually any relevant mitigating e~idence.~'
While virtually no limits were placed on what the defendant could introduce, the state was precluded from introducing evidence about
either the victim's personal characteristics or the loss t o the
victim's family and society. Booth failed t o realize that victim
impact evidence is not inconsistent with the requirement of
treating the defendant as a "uniquely individual human being."
To the contrary, the admission of victim impact evidence makes
the sentencing process more individualized by augmenting the
information that the jury should consider in determining the
appropriate punishment. Moreover, fairness demands that the
state be able to introduce evidence showing the victim's uniqueness as an individual human being.78 This gives the jury all
the relevant information about the defendant's moral guilt t o
make a fully individualized decision based upon the personal
responsibility of the particular defendant.
Precluding the sentencer from considering the harm resulting from a crime is inconsistent with longstanding principles of
criminal responsibility and the basic tenets of our criminal
justice system.7gThe effects of a crime on the victim and others is highly relevant to a sentencing determination of the
defendant's culpability,8' especially when one considers that
"sentencing decisions [as opposed to conviction decisions] [are
76.
Id. at 504 (alteration in original) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion)).
77.
See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2607.
As Justice Souter appropriately noted, "[alny failure to take account of a
78.
victim's individuality and the effects of his death upon close survivors would thus
more appropriately be called an act of lenity than their consideration an invitation
to arbitrary sentencing."Id. at 2616 (Souter, J., concurring).
79.
See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
80.
SeePayne, 111 S. Ct. at 2614(Souter, J., concurring).
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to] rest on a far-reaching inquiry into countless facts and circumstan~es."~'

C. Deference to the Legislatures Requires
Courts to Admit Victim Impact Evidence
at the Sentencing Phase
The Payne Court's deference to the legislative decision to
admit victim impact evidence is long overdue. Forty-four states
and the federal government have laws allowing the admission
of victim impact evidence during the sentencing phase of a
trial.82Such laws are permissible because neither the language nor the history of the Eighth Amendment delineate the
criteria that states or the federal government should lay down
in determining appropriate punishment schemes. Moreover,
these laws deserve special deference because the determination
of appropriate punishment schemes is strictly a question of
legislative
And because legislatures reflect the will of
the people, victim impact evidence should be admitted at the
sentencing phase?

D. Payne Resolves the Unworkable
Rule Set Forth in Booth
Booth's prophylactic ban on victim impact evidence at the
sentencing phase of a capital murder trial created an unworkable rule. Evidence of the victim's personal characteristics and
the crime's results on the victim's family is often presented to
the jury in conjunction with the facts that establish the circum-

Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 902 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
82.
Through 1988, 38 states had enacted victim impact evidence legislation.
See Talbert, supra note 3, a t 200 11-12. Six jurisdictions have since enacted legislation. ALASKA STAT. $ 12.55.022 (1990); ARK. CODEANN. $ 5-65-109 (Michie Supp.
1991); D.C. CODEANN. $ 23-103a (1989); KY. REV. STAT.ANN. $ 421.520 (Baldwin
Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. 8 217.762 (Vernon Supp. 1991); TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 5603 (West 1990). See also Respondent's Brief at 10 n.1, Payne
(NO. 90-5721).
"The deference . . . oweid] to the decisions of the state legislatures under
83.
our federal system . . . is enhanced where the specification of punishments is concerned, for 'these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy.' " Gregg v. Georgia,
428 US. 153, 176 (1976) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
84.
The people themselves should decide the appropriate punishment to be
meted out. In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 US. at 184, the Court said, "the decision that
capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community's belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an
affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death."
81.

,
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stances of the rime.'^ The two are often inextricably intertwined. Allowing victim impact evidence to be introduced during the guilt phase (because it related directly to the circumstances of the crime) and then preventing references to the
same information during the sentencing phase is inconsistent.
The same jury that determines the defendant's guilt may play
a crucial role in the sentencing decision as well. Thus, if these
facts are not kept from the jury a t the gudt stage, they will
likely be on the jurors' minds at the sentencing stage? I n
short, the Booth rule was practically impossible to apply.
One of two possible courses of action could hzve been pursued to correct the problem created by Booth. First, the procedural rules applied during the guilt phase of the trial could
have been changed to exclude victim impact evidence unknown
to the defendanLs7 However, this alternative "would [have]
seriously reduce[d] the comprehensibility of most trials by depriving jurors of those details of context that allow them to
understand what is being described."" Second, a separate jury
could have been selected for the sentencing phase of the
trial." This alternative was also infeasible because imposing
such a procedure on the states would have been unduly burden~ome.~~
Furthermore, even if the jury could have been successfully
prevented from considering victim impact evidence a t the sentencing phase of a trial under the Booth rule, arbitrary sentencing results would still have oc~urred.~'Booth required
that all evidence of which the defendant was unaware be excluded. Thus, if a defendant was unaware that a member of the
victim's family was watching the murder, such evidence would
.~~
if a defendant had haphave been i n a d m i s ~ i b l e However,
pened to catch a glimpse of the victim's family member, evidence of the family member's presence would have been admissible because the defendant was aware of it. The decision of
whether or not to admit victim impact evidence should not turn
on such trivial distinctions. Allowing the death sentence to turn

85.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2616 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 2617 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
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on such happenstance would have made the sentencing decision extremely arbitrary. The unworkable rule set forth i n
Booth was resolved by Payne, which allows admission of victim
impact evidence during the sentencing phase of capital trials.

E. Unduly Prejudicial Victim Impact -Euidence
May Be Excluded by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor emphasized that
the Payne decision does not 'mean that "victim impact evidence
must be admitted, or even that it should be admitted."g3 The
Court merely held that "if a State decides to permit consideration of this evidence, 'the Eighth Amendment erects no per se
bar.' "94 If states choose to admit victim impact evidence, Justice O'Connor pointed out that capital murder defendants can
seek relief under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
~ ~invokAmendment if the evidence is unduly p r e j ~ d i c i a l .By
ing the Due Process Clause, murder defendants can preserve
their constitutional rights where such rights are jeopardized. I n
sum, Payne adopts a practical, flexible approach. I t allows
states to admit victim impact evidence a t the sentencing phase
of a captial trial, but provides murder defendants with recourse
to the Due Process Clause if the evidence is unduly prejudicial.
V. CONCLUSION:
THE FUTURE
OF VICTIM
AT THE SENTENCING
IMPACTEVIDENCE
PHASE
OF CAPITALMURDER
TRIALS
The Supreme Court has finally paved the way for equality
between defendants and murder victims. Payne ensures that
the victims of violent crime can introduce victim impact evidence a t the sentencing phase of a capital trial.
Victim impact evidence is highly relevant to the sentencing
decision because it reflects on the defendant's personal responsibility. Such evidence also bears upon the defendant's moral
culpability because each capital defendant should anticipate
the foreseeable consequences of his or her actions. Additionally,
93.
94.
95.

-

Id. at 2612 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. (quoting Payne v. T e ~ e s s e e ,111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991)).

"If, in a particular case, a witness' testimony or a prosecutor's remark so
infects the sentencing proceeding as to render it findamentally unfair, the defendant may seek appropriate relief under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id.
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permitting states to admit victim impact evidence brings the
scales of justice back into balance because such evidence allows
the sentencing authority to consider the uniqueness of both the
defendant and the victim.
Opponents of Payne argue that the elimination of the per
se bar against victim impact evidence during the sentencing
phase of capital trials is unduly prejudicial to defendants. However, this objection is mitigated by a defendant's right to resort
to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment t o
exclude victim impact evidence that is unduly prejudicial.
In short, the Payne Court reached a compromise by allowing the use of victim impact evidence during the sentencing
phase of capital trials while providing defendants with an escape hatch in the event of undue prejudice. This, unlike Booth
and Gathers, is a fair result.

Stephen M. Sargent

